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Introduction 
 
I am grateful to have been asked to respond to Jakob Cornides’ article in this volume, 
‘Human Rights Pitted Against Man (II) – the Network is Back’. Cornides makes some claims 
which I think are unfair and do not survive close scrutiny, but he also makes significant and 
thought-provoking arguments, some of with which I agree, and some of which I aim here to 
refute.   
 
Cornides’ article is an example of a growing trend for normally Europhile civil society 
organisations, such as the Roman Catholic Church, to challenge the European Union’s move 
towards value integration through law. His angry, often bitter, piece speaks of a lobbying 
environment from which the ordinary religious believer and even the ordinary public is 
excluded – and which in his view has been colonised by manipulative radicals: 
 
‘There is a common theme: these radical groups have privileged, if not exclusive access to 
the institutions that tend to pontificate in the “creation” and radical re-interpretation of so-
called new “fundamental rights” for European citizens, while the mainstream of society is, 
contrary to long-established democratic values, brazenly ignored and excluded.’ 
 
One of the aims of the Fundamental Rights Agency – the target of Cornides’ article – is to 
promote dialogue with civil society. This aim has an important political history. By 2001, the 
assault on the European Union’s legitimacy gap had become so fervent that that the European 
Commission felt obliged to issue a White Paper on European Governance that laid down five 
principles of good governance. These centred around openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence
1
 (and were to apply to civil society just as they were to apply to 
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the European Commission itself).
2
 As yet, critics remain unsatisfied: only last year, Cécile 
Leconte argued that we need to create ‘spaces for normative contestation and extra-
parliamentary public spheres where dissenting views on societal issues affected by EU-level 
decisions can be expressed’.3 Cornides is not alone in his unhappiness. 
 
But there is another thread to this debate. The Catholic Church itself has had ‘privileged, if 
not exclusive access’ to the law-makers of Europe. The Holy See, alone among religious 
communities, has an official representative in Brussels. Also, this representative, the 
Apostolic Nuncio, is a member of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the 
European Community (COMECE), which holds regular meetings with senior EU officials. 
The COMECE is often consulted at the pre-legislative stage of drafting. When ratified, the 
Lisbon Treaty will add Article 17 to the Treaties of the European Union, so that churches 
(and their counterparts and comparable non-religious organisations) have a special  status: 
‘Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.’  
 
It is of course easier for larger churches and related organisations to meet the significant costs 
of maintaining a presence in Brussels – and thus maintain a dialogue rather than an 
occasional reactive response to individual, pre-defined initiatives. If we remember too that 
the Commission expects civil society organisations to apply its five principles to themselves, 
then our concern should range far beyond what EU agencies do, and consider what lobbying 
bodies do, to whom they are accountable, and which interests are still today effectively 
excluded from that lobbying. Cornides opens the door to an interesting debate, but we should 
hope that future articles in the journal extend it much further. 
 
For now, what we see here is not an excluded organisation, but an organisation whose 
influence in the European law-making sphere has been encroached upon through the sheer 
success of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) and other liberal rights campaigns 
in developing fundamental law in the EU (not just transient sets of rights accrued in 
individual states with temporarily liberal governments). What we see here is a view from the 
other side, as traditionally influential bodies lose part of their privileged place in the legal 
process.  
 
In the first part of his article, Cornides reprises an earlier article of his
4
 and attacks the Centre 
for Reproductive Rights (CRR) for their pro-abortion campaigning and their lobbying 
techniques. In particular he criticises their statement that there is a ‘stealth quality’ to the 
work they do. Yet the source he cites to attack their ‘questionable’ reputation is the website 
of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, whose mission statement includes the 
‘Vision’ of: ‘The preservation of international law by discrediting socially radical policies at 
the United Nations and other international institutions.’5 ‘Stealth’, ‘discrediting’ ... both are 
the language of lobby organisations, and the question is surely how much power either should 
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have in European law-making. We cannot criticise one without considering the role of the 
other.   
 
In the rest of this article, I will consider Cornides’ detailed attack on what he claims is the 
influence of lobbyists, and unwarranted liberal opinion, on two important documents released 
on human rights. I will also ask what we should conclude from this.    
 
 
The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights 
 
In his previous article for this journal, Cornides criticised the decision-making processes of 
the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, focusing on an Opinion they 
issued on religious conscientious objection and concordats concluded between EU member 
states and the Holy See.
6
  I do not have the space here to cover both articles, so I will treat the 
current one as it should be treated, as a free-standing piece, but readers may of course wish to 
read both.  
 
In his article for this current issue, Cornides reprises some of his criticisms. One of the 
difficulties in responding is that he uses a scattergun approach, firing off attacks on a great 
many fronts, often with no precise citations provided. This makes it a painstaking task to 
respond. I will however consider some of the main attacks. 
 
To begin with, he says:  
 
‘...it is certainly worthwhile to recall the specific circumstances that raised significant and 
widespread doubts about the good faith of the authors of that ‘expertise’. There was a clear 
bias in the reasoning of the Network, which systematically used a manipulative vocabulary, 
describing abortion as a ‘health service’ and pregnancy as an ‘illness specific to women’, 
and accusing doctors who acted in compliance with a law that prohibited abortion to have 
‘inflicted an inhuman and degrading treatment on women’ (i.e., not providing the desired 
abortion). Any argument supportive of a ‘right to abortion’, no matter how absurdly far-
fetched, was given widest consideration, whereas compelling counter-arguments were, at 
best, overlooked, at worst, decidedly ignored. The selective case law quoted by the Network 
related to cases that had nothing to do with the invocation of ‘conscientious objection’ by 
medical practitioners and were thus irrelevant to the subject of the Opinion. Even more of an 
indictment, the Network did not bother to acquaint itself with the positions of the Slovak 
Government or the Holy See, which, given that the Opinion concerned a clause in the (draft) 
Concordat then under negotiation between these two States, would have been the minimum 
professional standard of care expected of ‘experts’ - at least of those wishing to guard their 
reputation of independence and fairness. 
In short, the Opinion looked like a (clumsily drafted) position paper of a radical abortion 
lobby, rather than like the balanced analysis of serious-minded experts. And that precisely 
describes what it really was: for large portions of the Opinion’s text were nothing other than 
direct quotes from a submission made by one of the most virulent pro-abortionist lobbies..’ 
 
And so on, with more in that vein. The actual Opinion, if one reads it, is so different as to be 
hardly recognisable from the description here.  
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Cornides does not at this point cite any sources which would amount to ‘significant and 
widespread doubts about the good faith of the authors’. As for his claim that the Opinion 
describes pregnancy as ‘an illness specific to women’: this phrase appears only once, at page 
20 - and it is not a phrase used by the Network. It appears as an incidental part of a quote 
taken from a General Recommendation adopted by the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women. 
 
The Opinion does not accuse doctors acting lawfully of having inflicted inhuman and 
degrading treatment on women. Its argument is very different: it is that the State having made 
abortion lawful has a responsibility to make it available: ‘Denying to a woman the effective 
possibility to abort in circumstances where abortion is lawful under the regulations of the 
State concerned may moreover amount to the infliction of an inhuman and degrading 
treatment, in the meaning of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.’7 It cites case law on this very point, where a young woman was denied a lawful 
abortion in Peru: the circumstances of her case amounted to a violation of Article 7 and 
(among others) Article 2, because Peru was required to provide her with an effective remedy. 
The UN Human Rights Committee emphasised that Peru had an obligation to ensure that 
similar violations do not occur in the future. 
 
Cornides also claims that ‘large portions’ of the text comprise quotes from the Centre for 
Reproductive Rights. In fact the portions amount to five paragraphs in a 32-page document, 
and an appendix. The material is not some special submission solicited for the purpose of the 
Opinion, as Cornides’ comment implies: it was a submission for a relevant case before the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, Tysiac v. Poland.
8
 And far from 
being ‘virulent’, it consists of a detailed description of medical and legal provisions in 
member states.  
 
Cases on the fundamental rights of a pregnant woman, such as Tysiac, are most certainly 
relevant here, because the individual practitioner’s right to religious conscientious objection 
must be provided for by the State in a way which also recognises the rights of the pregnant 
woman.  
 
The Opinion is a careful and scholarly discussion of the religious conscientious objection and 
its status in relevant human rights law, which is what the Network was asked to provide. 
(Indeed, an earlier report of the Network on a related topic was quoted in Tysiac.
9
) Here, it 
was asked in particular whether certain agreements which protect the right of objection could 
amount to an incompatibility with fundamental rights and the law of the European Union, and 
the Network concluded that there were circumstances that it could. Cornides does not list 
what the ‘far-fetched’ arguments in favour of a right to abortion were, nor spell out his 
‘compelling counter-arguments’, but given that the Grand Chamber shortly after went on to 
state specifically at para 116 of Tysiac v. Poland that ‘[o]nce the legislature decides to allow 
abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real 
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possibilities to obtain it’, the onus is on him to show that they are compelling rather than 
defeated. (Tysiac had been decided by the time he wrote his articles.) 
 
I also find it disturbing that Cornides, when turning next to his criticisms of the CRR, names 
three of its advisory human rights lawyers (providing no source for the claim that these 
individuals - Paul Hunt, Philip Alston and Martin Scheinin - do advise the Centre) even 
though two of them, Hunt and Alston, do not have anything to do with the Opinion. He also 
describes the advisers as “hired”, which is inappropriate, because their work appears to be 
unremunerated.
10
 
 
It is not clear here whether he is arguing that Martin Scheinin is not independent because of 
this role in the Center taken alongside his role as a member of the Network. There is however 
a difference between asking whether someone is politically active (whether or not it would 
affect their impartiality) and whether he lacks independence, which would be a conflict of 
interest. As there is no suggestion that Mr Scheinin had any pecuniary or proprietary interest 
in the Center, nor any other directing role, the implication can only be that he was politically 
active. This is worth pointing out, but by itself it is not proof of partiality. 
 
More serious is the claim, which Cornides does back up with sources, by a former member of 
the Network, Bruno Nascimbene. Cornides cites a public statement by Nascimbene which 
denounced the Opinion, strongly insisting that medical staff should not be forced to take part 
in carrying out abortions (although this in fact is not a conclusion which the Opinion reached 
anyway). Mr Nascimbene also criticised the process by which it was reached, arguing that it 
had largely been written by the co-ordinator of the Network, Olivier de Schutter, and that he 
himself had not been consulted on its content and would not have approved it if he had.   
 
This is a serious allegation to have published in this journal, so I contacted Mr de Schutter for 
his comments. Mr de Schutter stated in his reply to me that the Opinion was drafted in the 
normal way for the Network: it was written in draft by one member (in this case, Mr de 
Schutter), then circulated electronically to all members, including Mr Nascimbene. A meeting 
was then held at which the draft was discussed and amended over a period of 3-4 hours, and 
then recirculated. Mr de Schutter states that Mr Nascimbene did not attend the meeting and 
instead sent a delegate, who did not object to the text. He also states that Mr Nascimbene did 
not contact him at any point after the meeting or afterwards, and he adds that the network 
adopted this Opinion, as its others, by consensus.  
 
Given that there is a formal statement in the Opinion itself at page 4 that ‘A draft opinion was 
discussed at the meeting of the Network of 17 October 2005’ and that ‘[t]his opinion takes 
into account the content of that discussion’, it seems reasonable to conclude provisionally 
that Mr de Schutter’s statement regarding the events is to be preferred, given that no other 
member of the Network has made any claim about inappropriate practices. However, we 
await any further light being thrown on the claim.  At this stage, it can be concluded overall 
that Cornides’ attacks on the credibility and the integrity of the Network, and the quality of 
its legal reasoning, are at best weak. 
 
 
From the Network to FRALEX 
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After engaging in this skewed assault on the reputations and motivations of those he opposes, 
Cornides implies that the Network has effectively reformed in the shape of FRALEX 
(Fundamental Rights Agency Legal Experts), a consultative body advising the new 
Fundamental Rights Agency (hereinafter FRA). He observes that around half of its members 
were members of the Network (but does not explain why they seem content to join an 
organisation which according to him produces documents they have no real influence over). 
 
His first aim here is to cast doubt on the FRA’s and FRALEX’s objectivity and expertise, 
beginning with an assault on the way in which authorship is apportioned on a particular 
report, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU 
Member States; Part I – Legal Analysis11 (hereinafter ‘The FRA Report’). He claims that the 
authorship is not clear, and that the implication is that we cannot tell who is taking 
responsibility.  
 
As is often the case in his article, the aim seems to be to suggest a vague sense of 
wrongdoing,  rather than to offer a reasoned critique. Cornides fails to make it clear why the 
question of responsibility is significant. In fact, the Report specifically apportions 
responsibility for the relevant sections between FRALEX and FRA. Nor does he make it 
clear why the question of authorship is significant. In fact, the Report uses a normal method 
of citation and there seems no reason not to conclude that Olivier de Schutter is the author. 
The Report specifically states that the FRALEX members provided background material for 
the report on behalf of each of the member states, and that two other named bodies carried 
out empirical research.  
 
The purpose of beginning with this criticism seems to be to throw an unspecified doubt on the 
Report’s legitimacy. But surely the point of the authorship and disclaimer is that they provide 
a helpful explanation of who did what. Responsibility is not evaded here; instead it is 
clarified.
12
  
 
 
The legal treatment of same-sex couples 
 
Having cast these vague aspersions on the bodies and individuals responsible, Cornides then 
turns to the content of the Report. Here, he is on somewhat stronger ground. He takes issue 
with the statement on p.13 ‘international human rights law requires that same-sex couples 
either have access to an institution such as registered partnership which provides them with 
the same advantages as those they would be recognised if they had access to marriage; or 
that, failing such official recognition, the de facto durable relationships they enter into leads 
to extending to them such advantages....’  A similar statement can be found on p.56.  
 
The Report is more circumspect later, such as where it says at p.58 that denying such benefits 
‘should be treated presumptively as a form of indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual 
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orientation’. But Cornides is right to ask that the Report be consistent, and to attack it where 
it appears not to be. 
 
Although Cornides does not say so, the Report rests its argument on two stages. First, there is 
the legal position for EU member states and second, there is the effect of international human 
rights law on this EU position. He discusses only the second. I will return to that in a 
moment. 
 
The European Court of Justice 
 
The first argument, not discussed by Cornides, is based on the Maruko decision of the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Justice in 2008.
13
 The case concerned an allegation of 
discrimination in the right to survivors’ benefits in Germany in which a same-sex couple had 
entered into a registered civil partnership, but had not been permitted under law to marry. The 
Court held that national laws on marital status must comply with the principle of non-
discrimination (para. 59). In addition, the Court held Maruko’s treatment to be direct 
discrimination – which cannot be objectively justified (unlike indirect discrimination, which 
can sometimes occur for justifiable reasons).
14
   
 
But one crucial point is that the Court based its decision partly on the fact that German law 
had evolved to a position of harmonisation where life partnership was legally equivalent to 
marriage. Maruko’s disadvantaged position was therefore anomalous in the light of the 
overall character of the German regime. The FRA Report is correct to state that ‘where a 
Member State has created a form of union comparable to marriage, and open to same-sex 
partners, they may not create an arbitrary difference ...’15, at least in areas falling within the 
authority of the Employment Equality Directive. But ‘comparable to marriage’ in this 
decision has been referring to a narrow meaning: it does not mean ‘similar to’, but 
‘equivalent to’.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that a ‘comparable to’ case in the wider sense could be 
classified as indirect discrimination, which can only be lawful if objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
16
 This is 
a high standard, notwithstanding the assurance in Recital 22 of the Directive that it is without 
prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent thereon. Maruko 
nonetheless is not an unequivocal authority for the proposition the FRA Report puts forward.   
 
Incidentally, Cornides asks why same-sex couples seeking the same advantages should not be 
subject to the same obligations. The answer is that they would be. The discrimination 
provisions in the Employment Equality Directive are symmetrical, so it would be open to a 
disadvantaged member of a heterosexual couple to make just such a challenge if same-sex 
couples were awarded advantages without obligations. In any case, the vector of social 
inclusion in national, EU and ECHR law has been strongly in the direction of ‘normalisation’ 
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– rights with responsibilities in a traditional style of relationship, as Carl Stychin foresaw.17 
Such benefits are being developed for the same-sex couple who seek to participate in what is 
effectively the institution of marriage and nuclear family, extended to include them. The 
benefits are not for other LGBT individuals who have more radical plans.  
 
The UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights  
 
We turn now to the second stage identified in the FRA Report, which argues that the EC legal 
position read together with international human rights law creates an even more powerful 
right than the one it identified under EC law. According to the Report, even where a 
comparable partnership or marriage right for same-sex couples does not exist under national 
law, it is directly discriminatory for there to be differences in treatment on the ground of 
sexual orientation between couples in an actual or de facto marital union. Thus, same-sex 
couples should by any suitable mechanism be given the same material protection. 
 
Cornides claims that this argument is ‘mainly’ based on the case of Joslin v. New Zealand 
(discussed later). However, what the FRA Report argues (although only by footnoting them) 
is that the key authorities are (a) the views reached by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) in cases involving the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and (b) a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. As the European Court 
of Justice made clear in Kadi,
18
 secondary legislation ‘must be interpreted, and its scope 
limited, in the light of the relevant rules of international law’, with particular status being 
accorded to the ECHR.  
 
It would have been helpful if the FRA Report had spelt out its reasoning based on these cases. 
However, we can examine the decisions briefly here. To begin with, we should consider the 
HRC decision in Toonen, where the HRC reached the view that ‘sex’ in Article 2(1) 
(enjoyment of life) and Article 26 (equality and protection) should be interpreted as including 
‘sexual orientation’.19 In Young v. Australia the HRC then made it clear that a legal 
distinction between heterosexual and same-sex couples could only be justified on ‘reasonable 
and objective criteria’.20 In X v. Colombia,21 the HRC reiterated its decision in Young and 
added that ‘differences in benefit entitlements between married couples and heterosexual 
unmarried couples were reasonable and objective, as the couples in question had the choice 
to marry or not, with all the ensuing consequences’.22 The distinction in pension treatment 
had not been supported by any reasonable and objective criteria, and so was a violation of the 
non-discrimination provision in Article.26.  
 
So, let us take these three together.  We can conclude that unless a state can adduce 
reasonable and objective criteria for maintaining a distinction between unmarried 
heterosexual and same-sex couples, both in a ‘de facto marital union’, this is discriminatory, 
in the absence of choice for same-sex couples to marry, and where the provision falls within 
                                                     
17
 Carl Stychin Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of Citizenship and Law Reform (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003) ch.3 and pp.108-111. 
18
 Kadi v. Council of the European Union (C-402/05 P) [2008] 3 CMLR 41, at paragraph 291. 
19
 Toonen v. Australia (Communication No. 488/1992, 4 April 1994, paragraph 8.7 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/d22a00bcd1320c9c80256724005e60d5 (accessed 19 July 2009). 
20
 Young v. Australia (Communication No. 941/2000, 18 September 2003), paragraph 10.4 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/3c839cb2ae3bef6fc1256dac002b3034?Opendocument (accessed 
19 July 2009). 
21
 X v. Colombia (2007) Communication No. 1361/2005, 30 March, 14 May 2007) and 24 BHRC 697. 
22
 Ibid., at paragraph 7.2. 
  
the province of the ICCPR. The HRC has extended this principle of non-discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation to many areas of law during its reviews.
23
 
 
This is important, but not enough to support the Report’s claim by itself.  
 
Karner v. Austria again dealt with discrimination in the treatment of unmarried same-sex 
partners when compared to unmarried different-sex partners. The ECHR held that 
discriminating on succession to a tenancy was contrary to Article 8 (private and family life) 
when taken together with Article 14 (non-discrimination). The state party had argued that the 
aim of the relevant legislative provision was the protection of the traditional family unit. The 
court however stated:    
 
‘37. The court reiterates that, for the purposes of art 14, a difference in treatment is 
discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue 
a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Petrovic v Austria (1998) 4 BHRC 
232 at para 30). Furthermore, very weighty reasons have to be put forward before the court 
could regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible 
with the Convention ... Just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual 
orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ... 40. The court can 
accept that protection of the family in the traditional sense is, in principle, a weighty and 
legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment ... [but] [i]n cases in which the 
margin of appreciation afforded to member states is narrow, as the position where there is a 
difference in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation, the principle of proportionality 
does not merely require that the measure chosen is in principle suited for realising the aim 
sought. It must also be shown that it was necessary to exclude persons living in a homosexual 
relationship from the scope of application of s 14 of the Rent Act in order to achieve that aim. 
The court cannot see that the government has advanced any arguments that would allow of 
such a conclusion. 
42. Accordingly, the court finds that the government have not offered convincing and weighty 
reasons justifying the narrow interpretation of s 14(3) of the Rent Act that prevented a 
surviving partner of a couple of the same sex from relying on that provision.’ 
 
Again this is an important decision for advocates of same-sex rights, but it does not address 
the marriage equivalence point directly. However, it clearly extends to it by implication, so 
any discrimination between marriage and same-sex de facto marital unions would have to be 
based on an objective and reasonable justification.  Protecting the traditional family unit 
would only amount to such if the aim was achieved by a proportionate means  - and one 
which was necessary. Karner seems a better authority for this argument than the other ECHR 
judgment in Burden v. UK, which is discussed at length in the FRA Report, but whose main 
value is its bracketing together of civil partnership and marriages, rather than any explicit 
statement of rights. I will discuss those in a moment. 
 
This brings us to Joslin v. New Zealand, a case before the UN Human Rights Committee 
which was discussed in detail in the FRA Report. Two lesbian couples sought the right to 
marry in New Zealand. Article 23 of the ICCPR specifically provides for a right to marriage, 
and the women argued that to exclude same-sex couples from this was discriminatory (as per 
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Article 26). However, Article 23 refers (in contrast to the rest of the Covenant) to ‘men and 
women’ rather than for instance ‘persons’. This need not mean that same-sex couples have no 
right to marry; rather it may mean that the Covenant is silent on the issue.
24
 What is important 
here is that the Committee thus concluded that New Zealand’s ‘mere refusal to provide for 
marriage between homosexual couples’’25 did not violate the couples’ rights. 
 
However, two members of the Committee, Mr Rajsoomer Lallah and Mr Martin Scheinin, 
appended a concurring opinion that elaborated on the judgment.  They said:  
 
 ‘This conclusion should not be read as a general statement that differential treatment 
between married couples and same-sex couples not allowed under the law to marry would 
never amount to a violation of article 26. On the contrary, the Committee's jurisprudence 
supports the position that such differentiation may very well, depending on the 
circumstances of a concrete case, amount to prohibited discrimination. Contrary to what 
was asserted by the State party (para. 4.12), it is the established view of the Committee that 
the prohibition against discrimination on grounds of “sex” in article 26 comprises also 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. (a) And when the Committee has held that certain 
differences in the treatment of married couples and unmarried heterosexual couples were 
based on reasonable and objective criteria and hence not discriminatory, the rationale of this 
approach was in the ability of the couples in question to choose whether to marry or not to 
marry, with all the entailing consequences. (b) No such possibility of choice exists for same-
sex couples in countries where the law does not allow for same-sex marriage or other type of 
recognized same-sex partnership with consequences similar to or identical with those of 
marriage. Therefore, a denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex couples that are 
available to married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited under article 26, 
unless otherwise justified on reasonable and objective criteria. 
However, in the current case we find that the authors failed, perhaps intentionally, to 
demonstrate that they were personally affected in relation to certain rights not necessarily 
related to the institution of marriage, by any such distinction between married and unmarried 
persons that would amount to discrimination under article 26.’ [my emphasis] 
 
Cornides criticises the FRA Report for emphasising this concurring opinion. He argues that 
none of the remaining thirteen members of the Committee agreed with it, and so he implies 
that it is a minority opinion rather than a concurring one.  
 
In fact, the other members said no such thing – and it is the Committee’s published version 
itself that states that the opinion is ‘concurring’. This does not mean that it necessarily 
represents the view of the whole panel, but it is good reason to conclude that it might. The 
statement should be treated just as any similar opinion would be: a persuasive authority likely 
to indicate a trend in the development of the Committee’s jurisprudence.   
 
Once more, however, these are important statements for advocates of same-sex partnership 
rights.  Even where a signatory state has not created a right to civil partnership, members of a 
stable same-sex union might have a conditional right to treatment equal to that of 
heterosexual married couples. But Cornides is right to say that the Joslin concurring opinion 
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– even if it does represent the panel’s views - is not enough to amount to a general 
requirement in international human rights law to treat heterosexual and same-sex couples 
identically (even in the areas of law specifically considered by the Report). It suggests there 
is a requirement to treat them the same in certain circumstances, such as when there is no 
reasonable and objective criteria by which to distinguish.  
 
The FRA Report itself recognises this in its discussion of Joslin (at pp.56-57). The problem 
lies, as Cornides points out, in the executive summary, which claims rather more.  
 
Does ECHR case law strengthen the executive summary’s claim? The cases cited in the FRA 
Report do show a line of rapid development in both EU and some international human rights 
law - which Cornides underestimates. The move in ECHR interpretation is significant. The 
FRA Report highlights Shackell v. UK in 2000 and in contrast Burden v. UK in 2008.  
 
In Shackell, the European Court of Human Rights (First Section) made a sharp ideological 
distinction between the two types of couple. The case dealt with a survivor of an unmarried 
heterosexual couple, and the important question for our purposes was whether she could use 
an Article 14 (non-discrimination) argument to compare herself to a widow, in other words a 
woman whose husband, as opposed to partner, had died. The Court however emphasised the 
legal differences between married and unmarried couples.
26
 It made it clear, therefore, that 
Article 14 safeguards individuals from any discriminatory distinctions only when they are in 
relevantly similar positions, and it took marriage to be different from mere cohabitation.  
 
It is very important then that in Burden, the majority clearly view marriage and civil 
partnership are as being of a piece. At paragraph 65, they state: ‘As with marriage, the Grand 
Chamber considers that the legal consequences of civil partnership under the 2004 Act, 
which couples expressly and deliberately decide to incur, set these types of relationship apart 
from other forms of cohabitation.’ It distinguishes these from couples who ‘choose to live 
together but not to become husband and wife or civil partners.’27 The two decisions of 
Shackell and Burden taken together make it clear that marriage and civil partnership are 
prima facie to be treated alike. Shackell emphasises the importance of marriage, and Burden 
emphasises that civil partnership (of the kind found in the UK) is akin to marriage and 
different from those who choose any unmarried relationship. 
 
It is important also to note the wider trend in ECHR jurisprudence towards re-conceptualising 
the concept of marriage, as Clare McGlynn notes, pointing out that in other case law, the 
right to marriage has been extended to transgendered individuals.
28
 
 
Cornides is however correct to emphasise that in para 65, it is made clear that member states 
are permitted to make their own judgments about whether to create the kind of civil 
partnership with full rights which the UK has. The FRA Report draws on Burden to argue 
that ‘any measures denying to same-sex couples benefits which are available to opposite-sex 
married couples, where marriage is not open to same-sex couples, should be treated 
presumptively as a form of indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation: 
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individuals with a homosexual orientation are particularly disadvantaged by such measures, 
since they have not made the choice not to marry, but are facing a legal prohibition to do 
so.’29  
 
Cornides is wrong to say that the cases lend no support to the findings of the FRA Report. 
The Report makes an important point about denial of choice.  Given the direction in which 
EU and ECHR law have been flowing, it may be that this denial of choice will eventually be 
treated as discriminatory.  But for now, we do not have quite enough evidence to insist that it 
will come about before the member states themselves have moved towards a stronger legal 
consensus in favour of, at the least, relevantly similar treatment. The Report makes an 
interesting and thought-provoking case, but in one important respect Cornides is right: it goes 
further than it should. We are not there yet. 
 
 
Free Movement for Same-Sex Partners 
 
Cornides next turns his blunderbuss on the section of the FRA Report dealing with free 
movement between states and recognition of same-sex partners. His ire is directed not at the 
text of the Report, but at a table on p.62. This indicates that the partner in a same-sex couple 
who are legally married in their country of origin must be recognised as a ‘spouse’ by the 
host state too. The first point to emphasise here, in response to Cornides is that the Report 
specifically states that the table is ‘simplified’. Second, the word ‘spouse’ is placed in 
inverted commas.  Third, the Report offers a more detailed table later, which begins at p.69. 
It might have been better for the simplified table to say ‘equivalent to a spouse’, but in the 
light of the whole discussion in the Report, it is disingenuous for Cornides to single this out.   
 
Cornides then claims that ‘there is a complete lack of any argument’ for this, but in fact the 
discussion is a long and careful analysis of the legal difficulties, which recognises that the 
Free Movement Directive does not expressly require all member states to recognise the same-
sex partners as equivalent to spouses.  
 
What the Report argues, instead, at pages 63-64, is that this amounts to a violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation. It 
might be helpful here if we consider the Preamble to the Directive itself, which states at 
paragraph 31:  
 
‘Member States should implement this Directive without discrimination between the 
beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinion, membership 
of an ethnic minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.’  No exception 
follows.
30
 
 
Cornides states that the FRA Report, ‘when interpreting the Directive, should have carefully 
weighted arguments and counter-arguments’ but he does not offer any himself. In all, this is 
an unfair and misleading depiction of the Report’s discussion, and it is to be hoped that 
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readers will (as throughout this debate published in this journal) prefer to turn to the Report 
and decide for themselves. 
 
What is more, there certainly are trends towards the kind of recognition the FRA Report 
recommends. A European Parliament resolution of 14 January 2009 welcomes the 
publication of the Homophobia Report, and states that the Parliament: 
 
‘75. Calls on those Member States who have adopted legislation on same-sex partnerships to 
recognise provisions with similar effects adopted by other Member States; calls on those 
Member States to propose guidelines for mutual recognition of existing legislation between 
Member States in order to guarantee that the right of free movement within the European 
Union for same-sex couples applies under conditions equal to those applicable to 
heterosexual couples; 
76.  Urges the Commission to submit proposals ensuring that Member States apply the 
principle of mutual recognition for homosexual couples, whether they are married or living 
in a registered civil partnership, in particular when they are exercising their right to free 
movement under EU law; 
77.  Calls on those Member States who have not yet done so, and in application of the 
principle of equality, to take legislative action to overcome the discrimination experienced by 
some couples on the grounds of their sexual orientation’.31 
 
It may be that mutual recognition of married same-sex couples is not so far away.  
 
 
Part II of the Homophobia Report: the Sociological Analysis 
 
We turn now to consider Cornides’ criticism of the sociological analysis which the FRA 
undertook.  This second part
32
 was released after Cornides wrote his article, but this does not 
prevent him from presuming that its findings will be based on the flimsiest of data: ‘the 
second part of the Study, rather than providing factual information, will provide explanations 
why such information cannot be provided.’ He later asserts that the first part of the study is at 
best ‘hopelessly scientific’ and at worst ‘manipulative and specious’ with potentially 
‘dangerous consequences’ for member states implementing its recommmendations. Based on 
some initial remarks in the first report, he describes as ‘astounding ... the way in which 
statistical evidence is interpreted.’  
 
He goes on to make the ironic observation that ‘if the statistics do not offer any evidence for 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation being a problem frequently encountered, it 
must be that these statistics are at fault.’ In his view, if few data are available to show that 
there is a problem, then we have no reason to conclude that a problem exists. 
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But statistics do not have an independent existence separate from reporting and recording 
mechanisms. Cornides’ impassioned attack is unjustified. It is perfectly reasonable for the 
author of the Part II Report, Morten Kjǽrum, to argue (a) that new equality bodies are not yet 
having cases reported to them and (b) that people fearful of persecution may not want to draw 
further attention to their sexual identity by reporting a case to an official body. Far from 
being an outrageous claim, this is normal in the early days of new monitoring regimes. In the 
absence of this, there is only limited information to draw on from bodies such as tribunals. As 
I will suggest in an example taken from the UK (the member state with which I am most 
familiar), sexual orientation claims there are not so different from those on other grounds of 
discrimination.   
 
Cornides claims that ‘[t]he truth is that the lack of reliable data affected only some Member 
States (for which no statistics were available), whereas for other Member States statistics 
were readily available and, no doubt, complete.’ By ‘complete’ he means that those which 
were reported and recorded. He bases this assumption of completeness on the country reports 
for each Member State. It has to be said that the raw data in these country reports are 
presented in an unhelpful fashion, but let us look at them more closely. Cornides emphasises 
the small number of cases which have led to a successful finding of discrimination, and 
points out for instance that in the UK, 1324 complaints over three years (2004/05 – 
2006/2007) led to only 35 findings of discrimination. (It may help readers of Cornides ’ 
article to know that this information is not in fact in the Report itself, but can be calculated by 
looking at each individual country report. The one for the UK is available online and the 
statistics are in the annex.
33
) 
 
This sounds devastating. However, let us take the example of sexual orientation cases in the 
UK. The statistics cited in the UK country report come from the Tribunals Service and can be 
found online.
34
 For England, Wales and Scotland (the Northern Irish data is more complex), 
470 complaints were accepted in the year 2006/2007. 384 were disposed of that year.  
Although these will not be the same cases (some will have been accepted in previous years 
and some will have been still pending), the breakdown is still helpful for our purposes.  
 
For a start, 157 of those cases, or 41%, were settled by Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) conciliation. We do not know how many were successful for the 
complainant, but it is unreasonable to assume that none was. Furthermore, 21, or 5% were 
successful – which in fact is the highest rate of success for any of the six forms of 
discrimination proscribed under EU law. Are we really to assume that there is negligible race 
or sex discrimination because those rates of success were even lower?  
 
Few would be so blithe as to assume that the full extent of race discrimination and 
xenophobia in the UK amounted that year to 102 incidents (a success rate, by the way, of 
only 2% of complaints).   
 
The simple fact is that tribunal data are not much indication of the extent of any complex 
social problem that can manifest itself in everything from employment discrimination to 
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crime to antipathetic media reporting and exclusionary government policy. Yet in a 
continuing attempt to minimise the significance of the Austrian cases further, Cornides 
inexplicably refers to the prevalence of all crimes reported and recorded in Austria, as if any 
meaningful comparison could be made between a selective set of civil statistics and the entire 
body of criminal incidents of all kinds known to the Austrian police.  
 
One incident that will not appear in the UK’s civil statistics is a particularly famous and 
brutal murder during that time – the homophobic battering to death of young gay man, Jody 
Dobrowski.  The BBC report of the conviction of his repeat offending murderers stated that 
Jody ‘was beaten so severely his own family did not recognise him and he had to be identified 
by his fingerprints.’ His death was unprovoked. His assailants had had a pre-meditated plan 
to ‘kill a gay man’.35 
  
Far from making a ‘gratuitous assertion’ that there is underreporting, as Cornides claims, the 
Report relies on the research to be summarised in the forthcoming second part of the study. 
But since Cornides is so suspicious of what the FRA and equality organisations have to say 
about the prevalence of discrimination, perhaps we should look at what the European public 
have to say themselves.  
 
The Eurobarometer survey is a study of attitudes about discrimination and equality in Europe 
which carries out around 1000 interviews in each of the member states of the European 
Union.  The second one was carried out in 2008.  Its methods are described in detail in the 
appendix to its 2008 Report.
36
  There is a brief discussion of these in the FRA Report Part 
II,
37
 but it is useful to look at the fuller discussion.   
 
One of the questions asks ‘For each of the following situations, please tell me using this scale 
from 1 to 10 how you would personally feel about it. On this scale, '1' means that you would 
be "very uncomfortable" and '10' means that you would be "totally comfortable" with this 
situation. ... Having a homosexual (gay man or lesbian woman) as a neighbour.’ Overall in 
the 27 member states, 5% chose 1, the option ranked as most uncomfortable.  If one in twenty 
participants described themselves at the furthest extreme of discomfort about something as 
inconsequential as having a homosexual man or woman as a neighbour, this surely throws a 
keen light on lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals’ reluctance to publicise their sexual 
orientation. And while this example by itself does not provide evidence of that such people, 
given the opportunity, will actively discriminate, it shifts the burden of proof to those who 
argue it is likely that little discrimination exists. 
 
Another question asked ‘Please tell me whether, in your opinion, in (OUR COUNTRY) there 
is a law which prohibits the following types of discrimination when hiring new employees ... 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.’ Overall in the 25 member states in which 
this question was asked, 30% thought there was, 45% thought there was none, and 25% did 
not know – the lowest level of knowledge of all the six strands of discrimination. Is it really 
so odd for the FRA to presume that there might be underreporting? 
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There is of course an immense scholarly literature on the phenomenon of underreporting. 
Instead of recognising any of this, Cornides instead resorts to mocking the proposals to make 
it easier for people to report discrimination to equality bodies. He snorts that they would ‘find 
“homophobia” wherever they search for it, in every grocery and every gooseberry bush’. He 
adds that the Report’s suggestions ‘remind one of a new kind of Holy Inquisition, vehmic 
court or witch-hunt rather than of a democratic society under the rule of law.’  Really?  
Expulsion, torture, and execution? The Catholic Church has long left such practices behind. 
But it ill reflects on a supporter of that Church to use its history to make jokes about the very 
people who were among its victims.  
  
 
Equal Treatment or Identical Treatment? 
 
Cornides’ next broadside is directed at the FRA Report’s discussion of discrimination. He 
singles out a quote which criticises the lesser extent of protection for sexual orientation when 
compared with race and ethnic origin.
38
 He takes this to mean a call for simple equal 
treatment, and he makes the reasonable point that different types of disadvantage require 
different solutions. He then goes on to make an extended case for not treating all identically. 
In his view, the argument is ‘simplistic, maybe purposefully so’. He concludes that ‘[t]he 
simplistic reasoning that all possible grounds of discrimination must be addressed by the 
same measures means that we are not anymore dealing with the unequal treatment of persons 
in comparable situations on the grounds of a specific criterion (e.g. men and women in the 
labour market), but that we are now comparing everything with everything.’ Then, having 
earlier made some rather disturbing oblique references to the ‘claim’ that homosexuality 
should not be put on an equal footing with paedophilia, he then makes the utterly bizarre 
suggestion that the FRA’s suggestion would prevent us from distinguishing between different 
types of heating oil. 
 
This, not surprisingly, is a world away from the reasoned legal arrangement the FRA Report 
seeks. Again, Cornides has impuned the FRA’s motives and quoted selectively before 
pouring out a stream of accusations. In fact the Report calls for ‘an equivalent degree of 
protection’ ( at page 12), not a simplistic model of identical treatment. The quote with which 
Cornides  maligns the Report is as follows: 
 
‘Under current EU law, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic 
origin is stronger and more extended than the prohibition of discrimination on any of the 
other grounds mentioned in Article 13 EC, including sexual orientation, and with the 
exception of sex. However, while the establishment of such a ‘hierarchy of grounds’ is not 
per se incompatible with international human rights law, it is in contrast with the recognition 
of sexual orientation as a particularly suspect ground and appears increasingly difficult to 
justify.’39 
 
We should recall here that the ‘Race’ Equality Directive is immensely powerful.  It extends 
far beyond work, into such areas of public life as social security, healthcare, education and 
access to and supply of goods and services, including housing.
40
  The General Framework 
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Directive which prohibits sexual orientation discrimination (and the other five heads of 
discrimination) does so only in the areas of employment, occupation and vocational 
training.
41
 The FRA Report here is making the quite reasonable suggestion that the benefits 
of the Race Equality Directive be extended.  
 
Just this sort of harmonisation is already in process. The European Commission in July 2008 
proposed a new Equal Treatment Directive
42
 covering religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation, to extend into the areas covered by the Race Equality Directive (with 
significant exceptions rather than identical treatment throughout). This is not a ‘strange idea’, 
but a proposal already being consulted upon.  
 
And whatever the result, it would be surprising if the draft Directive did not comply with the 
basic principle of non-discrimination which allows for exceptions where these are reasonably 
and objectively justified: in other words, a situation-sensitive approach rather than blanket 
provision.  Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Directive deal with the concept of discrimination and 
exceptions, and the Explanatory Memorandum for the draft Directive states: ‘there will be 
differences of treatment in the areas mentioned in Article 3 that should be allowed. However, 
as exceptions to the general principle of equality should be narrowly drawn, the double test 
of a justified aim and proportionate way of reaching it (i.e. in the least discriminatory way 
possible) is required.’43  
 
Demanding a double test may be, but it is a space within which opponents of any particular 
manifestation of equal treatment can make their case. 
 
 
‘Homophobia’ as the term of choice 
 
Cornides also criticises the use of the word ‘homophobia”, noting that there is no definition in 
the Report  itself.  This is true: a definition only appears in the Part II  Report.  It is 
effectively identical to the one he adopts from the European Parliament.
44
 The Part II 
definition states: ‘Homophobia is the irrational fear of and aversion to homosexuality and to 
lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people based on prejudice.’45 It also goes on to state that a 
“strictly accurate list of the issues covered in this report would be “homophobia, 
transphobia, and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and gender 
expression” (all of which are defined on page 6).  
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One need not query only the use of term ‘homophobia’. Sociologist Matthew Waites has 
powerfully pointed out that even the apparently innocuous term ‘sexual orientation’ tends to 
lead us to think of a fixed sexuality that is a core part of a person’s identity (pushing aside 
those who have discontinuous sexual attractions, or experience bisexuality, or who define 
themselves as asexual or for whom sexual relationships are unimportant). It also leads us to 
think of fixed genders of male and female (excluding those, for instance in cultures where 
concepts of several genders are seen as ‘normal’). All this may seem arcane, but Waites gives 
the example of Egypt, where an activist argues that the focus of law and political suppression 
is on conduct, not identity – what people do, not what they ‘are’.46 Still, as with the term 
homophobia, we begin where we begin, and human rights campaigning on sexual orientation 
began with traditional (in a ‘heteronormative’ terrain) concepts of gender and of family in 
domestic and international law.  
 
So what, then, is problematic about describing the phenomenon as ‘homophobia’? Cornides 
makes the point that the essence of the term is ‘irrational fear’, which links it to a 
psychological disorder rather than to an ‘immoral ideology’ such as the ones shared by racists 
or anti-Semites.
47
  Should we not provide treatment for those who suffer an irrational fear, he 
says, rather than regard it as a matter for criminal sanction?  It is true that the word is not 
particularly helpful today: the reason that it came about, however, was that it was a reaction 
to the social circumstances of the time. As Cornides notes, it was popularised (not coined) by 
activist George Weinberg,
48
 at a time when in fact it was homosexuality itself which was seen 
as a psychiatric disorder. The year after Weinberg published his book, the American 
Psychiatric Association agreed to remove homosexuality from the DSM (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders),
49
 the ‘bible’ of psychiatry. It is important to 
understand this social history to have an appreciation of how the term came about. It is not 
the best choice of term today, but it is rooted in a time, not so very long ago, when to have a 
same-sex orientation was viewed as a psychiatric disorder. 
 
The word is unhelpful for another reason, though: it focuses on individual pathological 
thinking, rather than systematic social processes of discrimination, or on social discourses 
which influence the thinking of individuals. So for reasons other than Cornides’ own, I agree 
with him that a better term could be chosen.  
 
Nonetheless, the term is the chosen appellation for now. Cornides’ next objection is what he 
sees as a failure to distinguish between an aversion to people of a same-sex orientation and an 
aversion to homosexuality itself; ‘[w]hy would it be inconceivable or illegitimate to repudiate 
the practice of homosexuality while at the same time fully respecting homosexual people and 
treating them with dignity?’ If we do not distinguish between the two, he maintains, we 
condemn all those who have a moral opposition, so that they are seen as either irrational or 
evil in the same way that racists or anti-Semites are evil.  
 
                                                     
46
 Matthew Waites, ‘Critique of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ in human rights discourse: 
global queer politics beyond the Yogyakarta Principles’ Contemporary Politics 15, no. 1 (2009): 137. 
47
 We use the word ‘Semite’ here as Cornides does, in its modern political connotation as referring to 
those of Jewish faith or origin, rather than its traditional sense, defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as ‘A person belonging to the race of mankind which includes most of the peoples 
mentioned in Gen. x. as descended from Shem son of Noah, as the Hebrews, Arabs, Assyrians, and 
Aramæans. Also, a person speaking a Semitic language as his native tongue.’ 
48
 George Weinberg, Society and the Healthy Homosexual (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972). 
49
 Gregory M. Herek , ‘Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking About Sexual Prejudice and Stigma in the 
Twenty-First Century’, Sexuality Research and Social Policy 1, no.2 (2004): 6. 
  
One answer to this is that the FRA and the European Parliament definition expressly 
condemn such attitudes where they are based on prejudice.  It is one thing to express a 
rational objection; another to have a fear or aversion based on prejudice.  For an example of 
EC legal protection of a limited right to object and to act on that objection, we need only 
consider the exemptions permitted in the Equal Treatment Directive, such as the ‘good faith’ 
exception in Art.4(1) to uphold a religious ethos, or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others in Art. 2(5).  
 
 
Nature, Family and Sexuality 
 
Cornides’ criticism runs deeper, though. Without a moral footing that rests in the ‘biological 
fact that the primary purposes of sexuality is procreation’, he argues, there is nothing on 
which to base a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘disordered’ sexual orientations such as 
paedophilia. There is however a familiar standard, which although it may not appeal to 
Cornides, is central to ECHR law, and was enunciated by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the sexual orientation discrimination case of Smith and Grady v. UK.
50
 
 
‘87. An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate 
aim if it answers a pressing social need and, in particular, is proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. (See Norris v. Ireland (A/142): (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 186, para. 41). Given the 
matters at issue in the present case, the Court would underline the link between the notion of 
“necessity” and that of a “democratic society”, the hallmarks of the latter including 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. (See Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldatrn 
Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria (A/302): (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 55, para. 36, and Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, loc. cit., para. 53.) 
 
88. The Court recognises that it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment 
of necessity, though the final evaluation as to whether the reasons cited for the interference 
are relevant and sufficient is one for this Court. A margin of appreciation is left open to 
Contracting States in the context of this assessment, which varies according to the nature of 
the activities restricted and of the aims pursued by the restrictions. (See Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom, loc. cit., paras 52 and 59.) 
 
89. Accordingly, when the relevant restrictions concern “a most intimate part of an 
individual's private life”, there must exist “particularly serious reasons” before such 
interferences can satisfy the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Convention. (ibid. , para. 
52.)’ 
 
The test for the Court then to distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘disordered’ sexuality is one 
which relies on some of the most fundamental principles of ECHR law. It asks whether 
allowing discrimination against those who express a particular sexual orientation is necessary 
in a democratic society for a legitimate aim. It also asks whether that discrimination answers 
a pressing social need and is proportionate to pursuing that legitimate aim. In deciding this, 
the Court must take account of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, and must divine 
particularly serious reasons before permitting an interference in a most intimate part of an 
individual’s private life.  
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This seems a reasonable way of distinguishing between same-sex relations between 
consenting adults and paedophilia. Practising lesbian, gay and bisexual adults, although they 
may shock or offend others, do not directly harm particularly vulnerable sections of the 
population. Practising paedophiles, who select those too young  to consent, cause direct harm 
to their highly vulnerable victims. 
 
Cornides nonetheless takes the view that a heterosexual marriage cannot be comparable to a 
stable lesbian or gay union. He bases this opinion on the claim that the heterosexual couple 
‘is by nature able to procreate’ and ‘found a family’, and thus ‘provides an important 
contribution to ensuring the future of society’, which also requires the couple to make 
‘considerable economic sacrifices’ for which they should be given support. The fact that 
same-sex couples are capable of enduring love is, he argues, ‘of no relevance’. Further, if a 
‘family’ was defined in any other way than one in which the parents are biologically capable 
of producing children, this would turn it into an ‘artificial construct, removed from biological 
reality’, apparently open to a legislator’s arbitrary whim.  
 
Indeed, he fears, this ‘unavoidably’ reminds him of the novel Brave New World, in which ‘all 
women are sterile, there is no marriage and no family any more, and having sex is merely a 
banal leisure-time amusement, devoid of any other purpose than experiencing “pleasure”, 
and without the love and responsibility that naturally accompany the sexual act’. A 
nightmare! I can only wish the deranged puppeteers of Cornides’ fantasy FRA well in their 
attempt to win over the European public.   
 
I quote this at length because (omitting the Brave New World fantasy, I hope), Cornides sees 
these aims as ‘clearly implicit in the expert group’s findings’. Considering that the entire 
legal discussion he has attacked is about a legally-recognised loving relationship between two 
people who wish to be together for life, this is quite an assault. I now address his claims.  
 
First, even if one accepts that the purpose of marriage is reproduction, which carries an 
economic cost, it would be entirely possible to frame a legislative regime in which both 
heterosexual and same-sex couples could marry, but in which only those caring for children 
would be entitled to social assistance.  This disposes of the argument that marriage should 
only be available for those who raise children. There must therefore be some other ground on 
which to deny same-sex couples the right to this recognition. 
 
The objection then must be that same-sex stable relationships are less moral than 
heterosexual stable relationships, and not deserving of the status of marriage. Cornides does 
not sufficiently acknowledge the value choices he has made.  He asserts his own value 
choices to be a communal tradition, and is entitled to do so, because they represent one 
recognised and established European tradition. But among many, it is only one. What he 
would like is not just less state recognition of same-sex unions, but less lesbian, gay and 
bisexual activity of any kind. But he has yet to offer a convincing reason to those who engage 
in it that they shouldn’t. 
 
The truth is that there can be no resolution to this argument capable of satisfying all parties to 
the debate. There can only be better and worse contributions. A better contribution recognises 
that there are a range of views held reasonably by different people who are otherwise 
regarded as morally upstanding individuals by current prevalent Western standards (we 
cannot be absolutely guided by past societies, and cannot predict what moral standards a 
future society might respect).  
  
 
Accepting that no final answer can be reached either by logic or by faith (because there is no 
consensus on faith), we can only aim for the best discussion we can. Challenging Cornides’ 
perspective, I will argue that a same-sex relationship between consenting adults is capable of 
being as morally good as its heterosexual counterpart.  
 
I have explained that marital economics could privilege childrearing, so that reproduction 
alone cannot be the reason to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. The next question 
Cornides’ attack raises is why, as he claims, the purpose of sex must be reproduction. 
Cornides  bases his claim on nature. But if we take biological propensities as any measure of 
this, then Cornides  must contend with the findings of animal biologists, who argue that 
same-sex sexual behaviour is found persistently not just in human groups, but throughout the 
animal kingdom. It is not just that Bruno Bagemihl’s famous survey records same-sex 
relations in over 400 different species
51. ‘Same-sex interactions occur in an enormous variety 
of taxonomic groups’, observe biologists Nathan W. Bailey and Marlene Zuk, and more than 
this, ‘[s]ame-sex sexual behavior is prevalent enough to influence the social dynamics of wild 
populations in some species’ (albeit not others).52 The fact is that same-sex sexual behaviour 
is ‘natural’ for a great many animal species, including our own. It may be either morally good 
or morally bad in our estimation, but it is part of everyday ‘nature’.   
 
If instead we were to argue that ‘nature’ is that which is self-evidently morally good, rather 
than biologically determined, then we would have to show what quality of moral good a 
committed same-sex relationship self-evidently lacks. Here we should take account of the 
classic comment by philosopher Thomas Nagel, who argued that ‘unnatural’ sexual 
inclinations are those in which the participants lack full reciprocity and awareness of the 
other. He therefore saw no reason to view same-sex relations as unnatural.
53
  
 
If we were to argue that sex is only to be valued and respected if it might produce children, 
then it is not clear why we should not condemn the sexual activity of post-menopausal 
women, or of individuals who are knowingly sterile. If instead they adopt children, what 
differentiates them from a same-sex couple who do the same? Cornides could cite 
philosopher John Finnis who tried to defend this distinction (and Andrew Koppelman who 
maintains that that the differentiation cannot work
54
), but he does not. He merely claims that 
heterosexual parenting is what ‘nature foresees’ for children, but nature (or plain old 
evolution) seems to have more complex designs.  
 
And what about a marriage between fully capable heterosexual individuals who decide to use 
a calendar-based method to prevent conception because they intend never to have children?  
Without an objective source of predisposition emanating from research in human or animal 
biology, and without a compelling moral argument that demonstrates a self-evident moral 
lack in same-sex loving relationships, Cornides can appeal only to social consensus about 
moral good. And it is highly unlikely that there remains a social consensus in modern-day 
Europe that sex is only morally good when it takes place for the purpose of reproduction, and 
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that marriage is only valuable when it is intended to lead to childrearing. There is not a 
majority in favour of same-sex marriage, but there are probably far fewer who favour such a 
restrictive view of the morality of sex. He is then left with tradition, and one can construct 
any number of knock-down arguments based on traditions we are today very glad to have left 
behind.   
 
If biology does not prove the point; if capability to consent and to love does not prove the 
point; if social consensus does not prove the point and if argument from tradition does not 
either, what are we left with?  
 
It can only be religious conviction. And while Cornides is very much entitled to hold a 
religious conviction and to have it respected if it is cogent, serious, cohesive and respectful of 
human dignity, his argument that his conclusions therefrom are ‘natural’, logical’ or 
‘fundamental’ has no persuasive power for those who do not share his religious beliefs.   
 
Beyond that, there are only suppositions. Cornides supposes that same-sex parenting of 
adopted children is on balance likely to prove in the long term to be harmful, but can only 
demonstrate at best that it is somewhat novel (or rather, atypical, since it is hardly new to 
human societies, however rare it may have been in the past). Likewise, he supposes that 
extending the conception of ‘family’ to include stable same-sex unions (those being the 
focus, we should remember, of the FRA Report he targets) will lead down a slippery slope to 
loveless, destructive individualism. He can suppose it all he likes, but he demonstrates it only 
by citing a novel.  
 
We are left then, not with certainty, but with fundamental disagreement. There is no trump 
card argument which explains why procreation and parenthood should remain the sine qua 
non of marriage in a changing world. Without such a trump card, why not return to the 
fundamental, the most basic principles of human rights?  Why not respect the requests of all 
those consenting couples who wish to love and to marry?  
 
What is most extraordinary – and revealing – about Cornides’ critique is that he is sceptical 
about the possibility that lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals are capable of love. Where 
would be the dividing line here? Are people who are mostly heterosexual but with bisexual 
leanings capable of profound love?  Is someone capable of love when they are in a 
heterosexual relationship, but when later in life they happen to fall in love with someone of 
their own sex, are they no longer emotionally competent?  
 
Cornides concludes by attacking the ‘preposterous´ invocation of human rights for a ‘self-
serving’ agenda. Those of us, however, who see things differently, who are painfully aware 
of the terrible and brutal oppression of sexual minorities over thousands of years, believe that 
equal treatment serves the interests of us all. And I am glad of the opportunity to debate this. 
The true witch-hunt is not for Cornides’ imagined petty victims, but for another group who 
still today face torture and death. There are many countries in the world in which such a 
debate is impossible.   
